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The Rhetoric ofFree Association and Palau's Political
Struggle
Richard]. Parmentier
he occasion for these remarks is the publication of a two-volume US
General Accounting Office (GAO) report to the House Committee on Inte-
rior and Insular Affairs (chaired by Representative Morris K. Udall) titled
U. S. Trust Territory: Issues Associated With Palau's Transition to Se/f-
Government (July 1989). The report reviews the oversight and assistance
provided by various US agencies, including the departments of State,
Defense, and Interior, the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, especially as the activities of
these bodies relate to the approval process of the Compact of Free Associ-
ation between Palau and the United States. The GAO research group,
headed by Nancy R. Kingsbury, conducted extensive interviews and
reviewed documents in the field in November-December 1987, and in
October-November 1988. My purpose in discussing this report is to use it
as a two-faced or "reflexive" ethnographic tool, first to confirm certain
characteristics of Palauan culture and second to reveal certain assump-
tions held by representatives of the US government toward Palau and, by
extension, toward other Pacific Island societies.
In this context I am not particularly interested in the truth of the
report's summaries of events taking place in Palau between 1981 and 1989
-I could barely figure out what was going on when I was there doing field
research between 1978 and 198o-nor am I concerned with the merits of
the report's substantive policy recommendations to the Committee on
- -- -- Interior-and-lnsul-arAffairs. W-hile-the-financial-scandals-, personal trage-
dies, and political machinations detailed in the report will probably not
constitute a Palau-gate for its readers, I hope to show that beneath its
bureaucractic rhetoric the report is of extreme interest to anthropologi-
cally minded scholars of the contemporary Pacific.
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THE PALAUAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
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Over the past two decades Palauan politicians have accomplished four
major tasks: in 1978 they guided the people of Palau to reject by a narrow
margin membership in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and
thereby to repudiate the position of the pro-FSM Progressive Party (led by
John O. Ngiraked and others); in 1979, as a result of this referendum over
the FSM and of Secretarial Order 3039 from the Department of the Inte-
rior delegating most governmental functions to local Micronesian legisla-
tures, they drafted and presented for successful ratification a national con-
stitution; in 1981 they inaugurated the first government headed by
President Haruo Remeliik (who had previously served with distinction as
the head of the constitutional convention) and consisting of a bicameral
legislature; and in 1982 they completed negotiations for the Compact of
Free Association with the United States, bringing to a close decades of
intricate negotiations.
Despite these proud accomplishments, few knowledgeable observers in
the early 1980s would have predicted smooth sailing for Palau's canoe of
state because of continuing factional disagreements over fundamental
political principles and priorities. One of the ironies of Palau's recent
political history is that opposition to affiliating with other Micronesian
entities to form the FSM brought together strange bedfellows, since both
those who wanted closer bilaterial ties with the United States (remnants of
the Liberal party led by Roman Tmetuchl and Lazarus Salii) and those
who advocated nationalistic self-determination (remnants of the Tia
Belaud party led by Moses Uludong) found themselves on the "no" side of
the referendum. The losing side found its political voice muted: those who
saw membership in the FSM as the only way to protect Palau from what
they called the "divide and annex" policy on the part of the United States
could now express their fears only through constitutional protections.
The decision to go it alone led various individuals to pursue increas-
ingly divergent political strategies, with some concentrating on hammer-
ing out the best possible terms in the status negotations for the compact,
- some foeusing on-developing personal-power bases in anticipation-of the
formation of a national government, and others devoting their energy to
drafting a constitution that proclaimed Palauan national identity, pro-
moted economic self-determination, and guaranteed the security and
safety of the islands' natural and human resources.
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Throughout these political debates a major source of conflict has been
different evaluations of the United States' efforts to fulfill its obligations
under the trusteeship agreement (1947). Some Palauans believe that the
economic and political ties with the United States begun during the trust-
eeship period should naturally evolve into an even closer relationship,
namely free association, which is not incompatible with Palauan self-gov-
ernance. These Palauans stress that without the continued support of the
United States Palau cannot hope to make economic and social progress.
Others believe that the United States has failed miserably in promoting
Palauan economic development and welfare for thirty years and that,
before Palau agrees to a termination of the trusteeship, the United States
should increase expenditures for such things as infrastructure, health, and
education. For this latter group, the "generosity" of funding exhibited in
the various drafts of the compact-a veritable laundry list of promised
improvements for each district and village-only indicates that the United
States has the financial resources to accomplish in the present what it has
systematically refused to accomplish in the past.
Individual political strategies came into conflict throughout the 1980s,
primarily because the terms of the compact signed by the status negotia-
tors (led from 1977 by Tmetuchl) were in conflict with specific sections of
the constitution (drafted by a special convention headed by Remeliik). To
be more precise, it was the US position that Palau should be free to draft a
constitution without outside interference, as long as the resulting docu-
ment was consistent with US strategic requirements. This paradoxical
policy was dramatically articulated in a clearly interventionist "commen-
tary" by Ambassador Rosenblatt sent to the still-in-session constitutional
convention in March 1979, which stated:
The United States has made clear that any prohibition against nuclear or con-
ventional weapons, to which U.S. cannot agree in the Compact, would render
the U.S. unable effectively to assume responsibility for the security and defense
of any area. As drafted, proposal 91 might effectively prevent U.S. warships
and aircraft from transiting Palau either in time of peace or war. We urge that
this proposal be dropped (as was done in the Marshall Islands).... Unless
---dcleted-;;~~-;~~~ded, th~-propo~~dTa~g~~~-~~~W~r~~rep~o~bie~s(;rthe--
utmost gravity for the U.S.
Less than three months later, copies of another letter from Ambassador
Rosenblatt were in circulation in Palau, this one itemizing the "total
-- -1
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United States financial assistance to Palau over fifteen years under Free
Association"-with a bottom-line figure of $247 million.
A new political faction that converged around these individual strate-
gies was the People's Committee for the Constitution headed by Alfonso
Oiterong, which condemned the extraordinary pressure brought to bear
by the United States for Palauans to alter their precious constitution to fit
the self-interest of the US military. In the electoral struggles for seats in the
Palau Legislature that followed the constitutional drafting process, the
people of Palau in 1980 replaced the generally pro-Status membership
with a strongly pro-Constitution membership.
POWER PLANT POLITICS
The link between local factional politics and Palau-United States relations
is revealed in the first major scandal of the newly instituted national gov-
ernment. In 1979, during an intense period of debate about the islands'
economic future, the Palau Legislature resolved that the electrical power
supply was "limited and unpredictable· in the 30 years of the U.S. Trustee-
ship" (1:76) and that this infrastructural problem was a serious cause of
Palau's continued inability to take strong steps toward economic self-suffi-
ciency. Two possibilities presented themselves: to continue to renew leases
on Army Corps generators or to contract for the construction of a new,
permanent facility. The legislature's task force actively explored both of
these options, the first by conferring with Army Corps experts and the sec-
ond by visiting Majuro in the Marshall Islands, where the British com-
pany IPSECO was constructing a generator. By September 1981 both
options appeared to be still alive. On 24 September representatives from
the Army Corps, in a meeting with President Remeliik and the task force,
recommended that a s.6-megawatt generator would take care of Palau's
power needs in the present and forseeable future. But on 29 September
President Remeliik issued a letter of intent to award a construction con-
tract to IPSECO for a 16-megawatt generator and oil-storage facility costing
$26.7 million.
- In-response-to-thesenegotiations,··theacting-deputy· high-commissioner
notified officials at the Department of the Interior and the Micronesian
Status Negotiations in clear and explicit terms that, even under the terms
of the yet-to-be settled compact, the IPSECO contract would leave Palau
unable to meet its loan obligations, especially given the "dire financial sit-
THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. SPRING 1991
uation" (1:79) at the close of fiscal year 1982. Not only did these officials
fail to take action, as required by the terms of the trusteeship agreement,
to avoid the impending financial crisis, but the high commissioner (who at
this point still retained authority to suspend legislation passed by the
Palau Legislature) refused to suspend a provision of Public Law 2-54 that
waived the requirement for competitive bidding on government contracts.
The high commissioner was certainly not following a principled strategy
of noninterference, since she did in fact suspend a different portion of this
same legislation; and she was even more certainly not acting responsibly,
given "her authority to set terms and conditions for providing U.S. finan-
cial assistance" (1:85). And, when the British banks guaranteeing the loan
sought more information about Palau's political and financial relationship
with the United States, Ambassador Fred Zeder encouragingly told them
first, that Palau had approved the compact on 10 February 1983-which
was not completely true, since the voters failed to give the required 75 per-
cent approval of a critical separate agreement concerning the transit of
nuclear weapons; second, that the compact funds would provide a "rea-
sonable portion of the capital funds for the proposed IPSECO project"
(1:87)-a view in direct contradiction to previous financial evaluations;
and third, that both Interior and Micronesian Status Negotiations "fully
support the efforts of the Government of Palau to improve its present
power-generating capability" (1:87).
To review: as administering authority, the United States created a crisis
in the power infrastructure, making it impossible for Palau to pursue
plans for economic development. Then, when the President of Palau chose
a long-term but unrealistic solution, the United States refused to heed
warnings from its own representative on the scene, and even took steps to
facilitate the Palau Legislature's effort to make ad hoc changes in its laws
designed to prevent wasteful, noncompetitive contracts. As a result, Palau
ended up with a generator it could not pay for, having a potential power
output it would never need, at a price it should never have had to pay.
Facing the real threat of national bankruptcy, Palauan politicians inter-
preted the IPSECO affair in two ways: some adopted an "I told you so"
--~~l:~~-~~~~~-- 1
intentionally trying to ruin the Palauan economy in order to make com-
pact approval a fiscal necessity.
A tragic consequence of the power-plant scandal was the assassination
Zlb .;11_# lfilli¢MA'ItMi#iIUSti!ii6§i4iRW,
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of President Remeliik on 30 June 1985, the day before he was scheduled to
make a televised speech concerning the IPSECO contract.
COMPACT ApPROVAL PROCESS
The sticking point for efforts to reconcile the Palau Constitution with the
Compact of Free Association lies in a provision of the constitution which
stipulates that any agreement "which authorized use, testing, storage or
disposal of nuclear, toxic chemical, gas or biological weapons intended
for use in warfare shall require approval of not less than three-fourths
(3/4) of the votes cast in such referendum." Since the compact clearly
states that the United States retains full responsibility for the defense and
security of Palau, and since it is US policy to neither confirm nor deny the
presence of nuclear weapons on its warships and submarines, the popular
approval of the compact requires either a 75 percent vote on this specific
matter or a prior change in the restrictive constitutional provision. Having
failed to obtain that required margin in five referenda between 1983 and
1987, the pro-Compact executive branch of the government decided to try
the second tactic. However, this came up against another provision of the
constitution, which states that constitutional amendments introduced by
the legislature must receive the approval of no less than three-fourths of
the members of both houses and, once approved, must be considered in a
referendum coinciding with a once-in-four-years general election.
Not until August 1987, when the Palauan people finally voted 73 per-
cent in favor of changing the constitution's strict nuclear provision and, a
few weeks later, approved the full compact by an identical vote, could
President Salii formally certify to the President of the United States that
the compact had been approved. Only then could the US Congress act to
ratify the approved compact: on 3 March 1988, the Pacific and Asian
Affairs Subcommittee approved it and subsequently on 28 March the Sen-
ate passed it. The victory was short-lived. After a series of court suits,
withdrawals, and reinstatements, and following a wave of personal intim-
idation, murder, and firebombings, the Palauan Supreme Court nullified
---- -_. - the Augustcomp-act vote-onthe-grounds that-the--approva!-processwas-
unconstitutional.
If the IPSECO scandal led directly to the murder of President Remeliik,
the nullification of the compact vote may have contributed to the suicide
two months later of Palau's second president, Lazarus Salii.
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A RHETORIC OF ASSUMPTIONS
A tacit assumption shared by the GAO report and other US documents, let-
ters, and policy papers is that the guarantee of millions of dollars of funds
in advance of Palauan political decision-making dealing with Palau-
United States status relations does not constitute "interference," "intimida-
tion," or "bribery." As noted, Ambassador Rosenblatt's 1979 commentary
on specific changes to be made in the draft constitution was followed by a
communication containing a village-by-village itemization of promised
compact funding levels. In describing the 1986 version of the compact, for
instance, the GAO report states:
Approximately 80 percent of U.S. assistance to be provided to Palau under the
compact is pledged with the full faith and credit of the United States. Should
the United States fail in any year to provide the annual amount covered by the
pledge, Palau would be able to seek relief in the U.S. Claims Court which is
granted jurisdiction for such purpose. In fiscal year 1986, the U.S. Congress
appropriated funds for Palau under the compact subject to its approval. These
funds have not been spent because the compact has not taken effect. (1:13)
Not only is Palau put on notice that the Congress has already approved
the funds-even before the deal is approved by the Palauan people-but
Palau is given specific directions as to how to claim funds in the unlikely
event of a US default.
One reason that this practice of "carrot dangling" does not appear ques-
tionable from the US point of view might be that the compact approval
process is viewed as an inevitable conclusion. The 1980s is considered the
uneasy and ambiguous period of "transition to self-government," that is,
as a transition from trusteeship to free association, despite the persistence
of constitutional impediments (1:54). By starting sentences with "Once the
compact takes effect" (1:14; ef 1:65, 1:66), the report, like US policy, pre-
judges the Palauan electorate.
Another pervasive assumption is that anticompact sentiment (held in
the late 1980s by II out of 16 members of the House of Delegates) is based
·····--primarily-on-th-e-behef-th-at-th-e-Ievel-of-funding-is-not··high-enough:-· -
"Although over half of Palauan voters have supported the compact in six
referenda, some Palauans stated that they will not support it unless U.S.
funding is increased" (1:44). In a more expansive account of the position
held by the majority in the House of Delegates, the report adds two more
1i1!ij!li\3&li.idLGZ
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motives: "Opposition to the compact is based on several reasons, such as
concerns about the level of funding guaranteed by the compact, the com-
pact's nuclear transit provisions, and u.s. rights to use Palauan land for
defense purposes" (1:67). The possibility is never entertained that some
people voted against the compact because, based on personal experience
over the past thirty years, political alliance with the United States is not
the desired relationship. (The United States has always had a difficult time
imagining the positive feelings many Palauans have toward other potential
allies, especially Japan. As victor of the bloody battles of World War II,
still close in memory to many Palauans, the United States forgets, as no
elderly Palauan can, that the period of Japanese occupation was also the
period of massive construction of roads and buildings, as well as efficient
communication and travel.)
The report's assumptions about Palau-United States economic rela-
tions can be seen in terms of two related paradoxes. The first paradox is
that the report admits that during the trusteeship period, when economic
development was the stipulated responsibility of the United States, Palau
did not attain any degree of self-sufficiency: "Palau's economy is charac-
terized by a small production base and a weak production capacity, pri-
marily due to limited national resources, the lack of skilled manpower,
and the absence of production-based economic development strategies.
. . . Manufacturing is almost negligible, agriculture and fishing are pri-
marily of a subsistence nature, and tourism is limited although it is a
potential growth sector" (1:10). Yet the report voices confidence that, per-
haps magically, "u .S. financial assistance to Palau under the compact is
intended to stimulate economic development and assist Palau in achieving
financial self-suffiency" (1:29). In fact, though, the actual prospects for
this development must not be considered too great, since the report also
indicates that the US military's contingency plans for Palau are "relatively
minor" given "its rugged terrain, limited infrastructure, and shortage of
labor" (2:75), although these three factors may facilitate the military's
authority "to designate defense sites and conduct activities and operations
within Palau's lands, water, and airspace necessary for the exercise of its
- a-uthorlty-arrdre-spnns-I:oiltry"-tI:I2-). Irro-rlTerwurds-, the-compm::r-is-seerr,- -
simultaneously, as the logical completion of obligations incurred during
the trusteeship period and as the perfect vehicle to codify a relationship of
financial dependency essential to meeting US foreign policy objectives.
This belief that a higher degree of "self-sufficiency" will result from
-I
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increased US aid is rendered even more puzzling by the second, related
paradox. The report assumes that fiscal responsibility and economic
progress in Palau require continued oversight by US authorities and evalu-
ation in terms of standards set by US experience, yet the failure of over-
sight or "lack of monitoring" (2:23) of Palau is excused by the desire to
support Palauan self-determination and to carefully respect fine jurisdic-
tional lines, especially after the installation of constitutional government
in 1981.
Interior officials said that since Secretarial Orders 3039 and 3II9 do not explic-
itly authorize Interior to intercede in negotiations for contracts and agreements
conducted by the government of Palau, they believe Interior can offer advice
but cannot prevent Palau's executive branch from exercising its contracting
authority. Officials stated that for the most part, they adhered to this policy
even when they believed that agreements were not in Palau's best interest. Inte-
rior believes this policy is consistent with its philosophy that the Palau govern-
ment became self-governing with regard to most matters in 1981. (1:19-20)
With regard to a fraudulent bond issue, "FBI officials told us that they did
not make an independent investigation of Palau's bond issue because their
authority to make such investigations in Palau is not clear" (2:18). In other
words, it is the US policy to make every effort not to overstep its responsi-
bilities in dealing with a constitutional government, while at the same time
encouraging the Palauan people in every way to change that same consti-
tution.
Clearly, the United States, following a "policy of non-interference"
(1:72), did not take steps to prevent the IPSECO contract and did not
actively promote public safety or support thorough criminal investigations
during the compact crisis of 1987-1988. But the economic damage, legal
turmoil, and personal tragedy of these events is the price of home rule.
Partly because of the political sensitivities associated with V.S. intervention,
Interior and State officials did not interfere with Palau's attempted compact
approval process. Based on their policy of promoting Palau's self-government,
--officialsTiomtFiEse-agenCies-a-gree,rili::lt-Fila-u's-legislatureana--jUaiciary--
should function without V.S. intervention. Also, based on this policy, Interior
treated executive branch actions as local concerns and acts of violence and
intimidation as violations of Palauan law that should be addressed by Palau's
law enforcement system. (2:51)
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The strategic withholding of parental reprimand will, however, nurture
the growth of the childlike nation: in the reported words of a Micronesian
Status Negotiations liaison officer, Palauans "have the optimism of a
youthful nation, and it is impossible to convince them their plans are unre-
alistic" (I: 80). The report envisions a situation in which increased "self-
sufficiency" will be caused by increased cash grants and increased "fiscal
responsibility" will be caused by "increased advice and technical assis-
tance" (1:42) by the same agencies that monitored Palau into economic
chaos.
While carefully documenting instances of the negligence, irresponsibil-
ity, and even possible corruption on the part of non-Palauan personnel,
the report does not consider the possibility that part of Palau's managerial
woes might be the result of Palauans studying US practices too closely.
Among the more disturbing details of the report is the description of con-
flict-of-interest and bribery abuses by Palauan officials, some mentioned
by name and others by office or title. While serving as Palau's ambassador
for status negotiations, Lazarus Salii was also owner of Belta Travel
Agency and in the latter role pursued a joint business venture with the pro-
ject manager of IPSECO to establish an airline on Palau. In 1983, just two
months after the signing of the initial IPSECO contract for $27.5 million,
the project manager gave Salii $100,000 (another $100,000 was given
later). Similarly, while serving as a legislator in 1983, the Speaker of the
House of Delegates drafted and signed the legislation waiving the compet-
itive bidding requirement to facilitate awarding the power plant contract
to IPSECO; at the same time he was also serving as the attorney for IPSECO,
for which he received $1.5 million in legal fees.
Such overlapping interests are, however, merely the Palauan version of
the sequential interests of several of the Western players in Palau's
"power" politics. The legal council for the Office for Micronesian Status
Negotiations retired from government service in 1983 and joined a Wash-
ington law firm that represented IPSECO in several law suits (not related to
Palau) totalling $142,000 in legal fees. The deputy high commissioner of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands resigned from government service
-- -in- I983-t0-bee0me-p:fesiEleIlt-0f-I-P-SEGQ--(-us),-with-th~assistaI1ce-QLapay~ - --- _
ment of $100,000 from IPSECO. While the actions of the latter two govern-
ment officials do not violate the letter of US conflict-of-interest regula-
tions, the actions of the Palauan officials reflect normal practice in the
Palauan context, where, according to a former Palau attorney general,
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"virtually every member of Palau's Congress does business with the
Republic" (1:98). Indeed, Palauan conflict-of-interest law exempts certain
kinds of government employees, such as presidential appointees, special
advisers and assistants, and elected officials-a not very restrictive set of
categories.
The report complains about the way Palauans "do" politics, and many
of the cited problems and abuses are regarded as aberrations or violations.
The cases of bribery strike the reader as especially blatant. But from the
Palauan point of view, one good way to "invest" in the future is to create
financial obligations in as many social ties as possible; when indebtedness
is spread around, the social system operates like a stock market or futures
market. Direct payment of money (either currency or traditional valu-
ables) is an accepted way to "heal wounds and establish a friendship"
(1:97), although the authors of the report are not aware of this custom.
This is one reason that the motives behind US actions are often under-
stood so clearly in Palau: what they consider a "debt," the United States
calls a "bribe"; what the United States calls "funding," Palauans under-
stand as an obvious "investment" in the future of the United States, not of
Palau.
The report also complains that too many decisions seem to be made
without Palauan officials consulting either the office assigned responsibil-
ity for the issue or other elected officials. Here again the Palauan under-
standing of political "representation" differs to a degree from the Ameri-
can: officials in Palau, especially the president and vice president, are
selected for who they are-politically, socially, economically, and person-
ally-and Palauan leaders are then supposed to lead, quietly but confi-
dently. Palauan politicians do "represent" their constituencies, but more
by constituting them than by reflecting them. To think that a president of
Palau in favor of the compact would not take strong and effective steps to
influence the outcome of a referendum is to misunderstand Palauan politi-
cal life. The "secrecy" of political decision-making, the equivalent of our
own "smoke-filled rooms," is a necessary part of information manage-
ment, essential in an island society where talk is a passionate activity. And
-- ----- ~~-- -~ --eoncern-over-~confhct-of-interest!Lalso-needs-to-be-seenin-lucatTe-rm-s-:-lIr
Palau, a strong leader combines political power, social or family rank,
financial resources, and even religious wisdom; ideally, all should go
together. For a leader not to have a financial interest in political decisions
could be seen as a mark of cultural incompetence.
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As Palau looks forward to a new decade of political decision-making,
one might wonder to what degree Palau's tragic experiences of the 1980s
might actually be a positive contribution. Students of Palauan ethnogra-
phy have long pointed to the society's tendency to generate factional dis-
putes at many levels, between rival family groups competing for a title,
between paired men's clubs in a village, or between "sides" of the whole
polity. The steady penetration of foreign money (in many shapes) over the
past several decades has certainly provided "capital" to keep this factional-
ism alive. But I sense-though from afar-that the political struggle over
the compact may have pushed the society to such a test of its will and
"heart" that national unity may, in the not too distant future, come to
override both transient political bickering and historically embedded divi-
sion. Palauan politicians, traditional and modern, speak of the nation as a
"sailing canoe" pushed to the edge of capsizing. Citing recent evidence of
political cooperation and employing this metaphor, a prominent contem-
porary politician editorialized in January 1989, on the eve of still another
referendum:
The decade of the 80'S ended as it began with the exception that now was
heard a resounding note of reconciliation on the part of our past and present
political leaders who have joined hands in an unprecedented effort to seek the
final approval of the Compact of Free Association. As the decade of the 80'S
closed there comes to mind the advice found in an old and familiar Chesols
[Palauan Chant] which roughly translates as follows:
My dear Demalasoi
It is bad to sail separately
It is better to sail together in one canoe
As our canoe shall not capsize.
POSTSCRIPT
Despite signs of political unity among Palau's national and local leaders,
the voters again failed to approve the Compact of Free Association in a
referendum on 6 February 1990. Prior to the vote, a group of politicians,
------ - -including -President-Etpison,-pr0minent-Iegislat0rs,-ana-state-g0veFIl0FS, - - --- -------
issued a declaration proclaiming their "joint and common intention to
publicly and personally support the approval of the Compact of Free
Association." But since only 60.8 percent of voters approved the compact,
these politicians now face the task of trying to amend the constitution to
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allow a majority vote for compact approval and the prospect of increased
US intervention in national fiscal and governmental affairs, as the trustee-
ship continues into the I990S.
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